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Can Mechanisms Really Replace Laws
of Nature?*
Bert Leuridan†‡
Today, mechanisms and mechanistic explanation are very popular in philosophy of science
and are deemed a welcome alternative to laws of nature and deductive-nomological
explanation. Starting from Mitchell’s pragmatic notion of laws, I cast doubt on their
status as a genuine alternative. I argue that (1) all complex-systems mechanisms onto-
logically must rely on stable regularities, while (2) the reverse need not hold. Analogously,
(3) models of mechanisms must incorporate pragmatic laws, while (4) such laws them-
selves need not always refer to underlying mechanisms. Finally, I show that Mitchell’s
account is more encompassing than the mechanistic account
1. Introduction. Today, mechanisms and mechanistic models are very
popular in philosophy of science, in particular in philosophy of the life
sciences. Mechanicist philosophers like Machamer, Darden, and Craver
(2000) and Bechtel and Abrahamsen (2005) set their face against the
dominant position that strict laws of nature and deductive-nomological
(D-N) explanation have occupied for years on end.1 Their opposition is
not groundless. The criteria for lawfulness that have been advanced by,
for example, Nagel (1961), Hempel (1965), and Goodman (1973) and that
are considered the received view are highly problematic. Strict laws de-
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1. By ‘law of nature’ or ‘natural law’, I mean a generalization describing a regularity,
not some metaphysical entity that produces or is responsible for that regularity. I also
explicitly distinguish between traditional or strict laws and regularities (which are
rightly criticized by the mechanicists) on the one hand and pragmatic laws and reg-
ularities on the other hand.
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scribe strict regularities. They are universal and have no genuine excep-
tions. They are nonvacuously true or at least very well supported by
empirical data. They are general or nonlocal and contain only purely
qualitative predicates. They also are projectable and have unlimited scope.
Finally, they are somehow necessary (or noncontingent). If laws of nature
are interpreted in this strict sense, we should classify almost all scientific
generalizations as accidental. This holds for physics, as well as for chem-
istry, biology, and the social sciences.2 If there are no strict laws, there
are no D-N explanations. Hence, the mechanicist alternative, which states
that explanation involves mechanistic models (i.e., descriptions of mech-
anisms) instead of strict laws, might be very welcome.
The received view has been attacked from other sides as well. Instead
of abandoning the concept of natural law, Mitchell (1997, 2000) proposes
to revise it. In her view, laws of nature should be interpreted pragmatically.
A generalization is a pragmatic law if it allows for prediction, explanation,
and manipulation, even if it fails to satisfy the traditional criteria. To this
end, it should describe a stable regularity but not necessarily a strict one.
What is the precise relation between mechanisms and stable regularities
or between mechanistic models and pragmatic laws is still an open ques-
tion, which I address in this article. Does the mechanistic account render
Mitchell’s pragmatic solution superfluous? No. I show that the mecha-
nistic literature cannot replace (but rather depends on) talk in terms of
laws of nature, provided the latter are conceived of pragmatically. What
is more, Mitchell’s account is more encompassing than the mechanicists’
and thus deserves our attention even in view of the patent mechanistic
successes.
In sections 2 and 3, I present mechanisms and mechanistic models and
raise the question whether mechanisms really are an alternative to reg-
ularities. This question is answered in the rest of this article. In section
4, I discuss pragmatic laws and their corresponding regularities. Together,
sections 2–4 set the stage for the arguments presented in the rest of this
article, where I make four related claims. In sections 5 and 6, I substantiate
two ontological claims and two epistemological claims, respectively. First,
mechanisms are ontologically dependent on stable regularities. There are
no mechanisms without both macrolevel and microlevel stable regularities.
Second, there may be stable regularities without any underlying mecha-
nism. Third, models of mechanisms are epistemologically dependent on
pragmatic laws. To adequately model a mechanism, one has to incorporate
2. Cartwright (1983) has made the case regarding physics, and Christie (1994), re-
garding chemistry. Beatty (1995, 1997), Brandon (1997), and Sober (1997) have argued
against strict laws in biology. Beed and Beed (2000) and Roberts (2004) discuss strict
laws in the social sciences.
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pragmatic laws. Finally, pragmatic laws are themselves not epistemolog-
ically dependent on mechanistic models. They need not always refer to a
mechanism underlying the regularity at hand. In section 7, I conclude by
showing that Mitchell’s account is more encompassing than the mechani-
cist account. Thus, that account cannot replace talk in terms of laws,
provided the latter are conceived of pragmatically (which, I think, they
should be).
2. Mechanisms. From the end of the 1970s onward, the concept of ‘mech-
anism’ has regained popularity in philosophy of science. Different families
of concepts can be distinguished. In the Salmon/Dowe account (Salmon
1984; Dowe 2000), mechanisms are characterized in terms of causal pro-
cesses and causal interactions. In this article, I do not consider this ac-
count. Rather, I focus on the complex-systems approach defended by, for
example, Glennan, Woodward, Machamer and colleagues, and Bechtel
and Abrahamsen. In this approach, mechanisms are treated as complex
systems of interacting parts. Contrary to Salmon/Dowe mechanisms, com-
plex-systems mechanisms (cs-mechanisms) are robust or stable. They form
stable configurations of robust objects, and as a whole they have stable
dispositions: the overall behaviors of these mechanisms (see Glennan 2002,
S344–S346). This difference will prove very relevant in the following sec-
tions.
Moreover, I focus on the theories of Machamer et al. (2000) and of
Bechtel and Abrahamsen (2005). (My findings can be extended to, e.g.,
Glennan [2002], Woodward [2002], and Craver [2007], all of whom ex-
plicitly endorse the role of what I call ‘causal P-laws’ in the mechanistic
approach.) Both theories are mainly concerned with the life sciences, and
they both present mechanisms and mechanistic explanation as an alter-
native to strict laws of nature and D-N explanation.
In their famous article, “Thinking about Mechanisms,” Machamer et
al. (2000) define mechanisms as complex systems:
(M*) [cs-]Mechanisms are entities and activities organized such that
they are productive of regular changes from start or set-up to finish
or termination conditions. (3)
Entities are the things that engage in activities. Activities are the producers
of change. The authors defend a dualistic metaphysics that combines
substantivalist notions with concepts from process philosophy. Entities
and activities, they claim, are complementary, interdependent concepts
(4–8). If entities and activities are adequately organized, they behave reg-
ularly.
Bechtel and Abrahamsen’s (2005) definition of mechanisms is somewhat
different, but it portrays mechanisms as organized, complex systems, too:
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(M†) A [cs-]mechanism is a structure performing a function in virtue
of its component parts, component operations, and their organiza-
tion. The orchestrated functioning of the mechanism is responsible
for one or more phenomena. (423)
Definition M† strongly resembles M*. The component parts are clearly
entities. Operations resemble activities. (Bechtel and Abrahamsen [2005,
423] use the label ‘operation’ instead of ‘activity’ because they wish to
draw attention to the involvement of parts.) And the mechanism’s parts
and activities must be organized or orchestrated. Yet Bechtel and Abra-
hamsen add to M* the notion of function (423–24). Machamer et al.
(2000) and Bechtel and Abrahamsen (2005) stress the role of mechanistic
models in explanation. What is important is that they do so at the expense
of strict laws. They signal several distinct but related problems regarding
strict laws and D-N explanation. First, strict regularities are rarely if ever
discovered in the life sciences. But if strict biological laws are rare or
nonexistent, D-N explanations would not be practicable in the life sci-
ences. Second, Bechtel and Abrahamsen append to this that their account
avoids some hard ontological problems. Staking on mechanisms as real
systems in nature, they write, has the advantage that “one does not have
to face questions comparable to those faced by nomological accounts of
explanation about the ontological status of laws” (425). Third, even if
there were strict biological laws, there is no denying that explanation in
the life sciences usually takes the form of mechanistic explanation. Bechtel
and Abrahamsen write that: “Explanations in the life sciences frequently
involve presenting a model of the mechanism taken to be responsible for
a given phenomenon. Such explanations depart in numerous ways from
nomological explanations commonly presented in philosophy of science”
(421; my emphasis; see also Bechtel and Richardson 1993, 231). Machamer
et al. (2000) make a stronger claim: “In many fields of science what is
taken to be a satisfactory explanation requires providing a description of
a mechanism” (1; my emphasis).
Finally, both groups of authors argue that even if there were strict
biological laws, D-N explanations would not be sufficiently explanatory.
Explanation, they say, involves more than subsumption under a law or
regularity. Laws or regularities do not explain why some phenomenon
occurs. According to Machamer et al. (2000), activities are essential for
rendering phenomena intelligible. A mechanistic explanation makes a phe-
nomenon intelligible by providing an elucidative relation between the
explanans and the explanandum, that is, by revealing the productive re-
lation between the mechanism’s setup conditions, intermediate stages, and
termination conditions. This productive relation is completely accounted
for by the mechanism’s activities: “It is not the regularities that explain
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but the activities that sustain the regularities” (21–22). They append to
this that “regularities are non-accidental and support counterfactuals to
the extent that they describe activities. . . . No philosophical work is
done by positing some further thing, a law, that underwrites the produc-
tivity of activities” (7–8; terminological prudence is in order here. In my
terms, regularities are ontological and cannot describe activities. And I
do not adhere to laws as metaphysical entities that underwrite the pro-
ductivity of activities). According to Bechtel and Abrahamsen (2005),
subsumption under a law does not show why the explanandum phenom-
enon occurred: “Even if accorded the status of a law, this statement [con-
cerning the ratio of oxygen molecules consumed to adenosine triphosphate
in metabolism] merely brings together a number of actual and potential
cases as exemplars of the same phenomenon and provides a characteri-
zation of that phenomenon. However, it would not explain why the phe-
nomenon occurred—either in general or in any specific case” (422). To
explain why, scientists (biologists) explain how. They provide a model of
the mechanism underlying the phenomenon in question.
In short, M* and M† are motivated by the apparent shortcomings of
the concepts of strict law/regularity and D-N explanation (in the context
of the life sciences). Mechanisms and mechanistic explanation are put
forward as an alternative. I side with the mechanicists in their critical
assessment of both strict laws/regularities and D-N explanation. I also
endorse the view that ‘mechanism’ and ‘mechanistic explanation’ are very
fruitful concepts. Yet I doubt whether the mechanistic account provides
an alternative to talk in terms of laws of nature.
3. Are Mechanisms an Alternative to Regularities? In this section, I show
that both M* and M† depend on the concept of ‘regularity’—at least
prima facie: they mention regularities either explicitly or implicitly. In
section 5, I argue that this is no coincidence: cs-mechanisms are onto-
logically dependent on the existence of regularities. Definition M* men-
tions regularities explicitly: mechanisms are productive of regular changes.
Definition M† does not. However, it states that mechanisms perform a
function. What is the relation between ‘function’ and ‘regularity’? In this
section, I argue that functions are best conceived of as dispositions, that
dispositions always involve regularities, and hence that M† implicitly refers
to regularities.
That functions are dispositional is evident from different theories of
function. Consider first the dispositional theory of functions (e.g., Bigelow
and Pargetter 1987).
(DTF) An effect e of a character c is a function of that character if
it confers a survival-enhancing propensity on the creature having c.
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Bigelow and Pargetter interpret propensities dispositionally. It is not re-
quired that e enhances survival (or reproduction) in all individuals all of
the time. The dispositional theory of functions is itself not unquestioned.
An alternative to DTF is the etiological theory of functions (e.g., Mitchell
2003, 92).
(ETF) An effect e of a character or component c is a function of
that character or component if it has played an essential role in the
causal history issuing in the presence of that very component.
During this causal history, c must have been selected over alternatives on
the basis of its doing e, and it must have been produced or reproduced
as a direct result of that selection process (96). By its reference to natural
selection, the etiological theory links functions to fitness, which is a dis-
positional characteristic. So even if functions are interpreted etiologically,
they should be regarded as dispositional.
Both DTF and ETF refer to evolution and selection, but perhaps selective
function is not what Bechtel and Abrahamsen have in mind. (Bechtel and
Abrahamsen [2005] are not clear about what they mean by ‘function’.)
A different and less restrictive notion of ‘function’ derives from the works
of Cummins (see Craver [2007] for a detailed discussion of Cummins’s
work). For Cummins (1975, 756), function should not be linked with
evolutionary considerations. Yet he explicitly links functions with dis-
positions. “Thus, function-ascribing statements imply disposition state-
ments; to attribute a function to something is, in part, to attribute a
disposition to it” (758). Even if the function of x is to do f, it is not
required that x does f all the time.
Since functions are dispositions, they presuppose the existence of reg-
ularities, as I now show. Even if there is no consensus about the correct
analysis of dispositions, all attempts seem to have in common that dis-
positions involve regularities. (For an overview of the most prevalent
definitions of ‘disposition’, see Fara [2006].) Roughly, a disposition can
be characterized as follows:
(DISP) An object is disposed to M when C, if and only if, if it were
the case that C and W, then it would .f(M )
Variable M refers to a manifestation, and C refers to the conditions of
manifestation. In the case of the fragile glass, M could be ‘breaking’, and
C could be ‘being struck’. Variable W stands for the extra conditions that
should be included in the definition or analysis of dispositions. The simple
conditional analysis, which leaves W empty, is victim to several counter-
examples, and a large part of the literature about dispositions concerns
the question of what other conditions should be included inW (e.g., David
Lewis has suggested that an object is disposed to M when C if and only
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if it has an intrinsic property B such that, if it were the case that C and
if the object were to retain B, then the object would M because C and
because it has B; see Fara 2006, sec. 2.3). The f operator stands for the
modal or probabilistic strength that should be included in the definition
of dispositions. According to the simple conditional analysis, the object
should always M if it were the case that C. Again, this makes the simple
conditional analysis victim to several counterexamples. Therefore, it has
been proposed to interpret f less strictly, namely, habitually (Fara 2006,
sec. 2.4) or probabilistically (Prior, Pargetter, and Jackson 1982). What is
relevant for the present discussion is as follows: even if we would allow for
dispositions that are seldom manifested when their manifestation conditions
C obtain, f cannot be replaced by ‘never’ since this would result in a
contradictio in terminis.3 If the conditions in W are satisfied, .4P(MFC ) 1 0
So far we can safely conclude that both Machamer et al. (2000) and
Bechtel and Abrahamsen (2005) define mechanisms in terms of regularities
(either explicitly or implicitly). This raises a first question, namely, whether
this use of ‘regularity’ is necessary or unavoidable. This question is an-
swered in section 5. It should also be noticed that neither gives a detailed
characterization of these regularities. They only describe them negatively:
they are not strict. This raises a second question that I answer in section
4, namely, how these regularities should be conceived of. Regularities are
a blind spot in the mechanistic literature. This blind spot can be removed
by means of a more adequate theory of regularities and lawfulness.
4. Pragmatic Laws and Regularities. Instead of rejecting the concept of
natural law, Sandra Mitchell (1997, 2000) sets out to refine it. She, too,
3. The claim that dispositions involve regularities is explicitly found in Cummins
(1975): “To attribute a disposition d to an object a is to assert that the behavior of a
is subject to (exhibits or would exhibit) a certain lawlike regularity” (758). He calls
these lawlike regularities ‘dispositional regularities’. Contrary to me, Cummins seems
to conceive of these as strict regularities.
4. If there are dispositions that are seldom manifested when their manifestation con-
ditions C hold, what follows may serve as an example. A lottery is being held with
1,000,050 tickets. The tickets range from 1 to 1 million, but there are 51 tickets with
the number 666. In this case, on might say, the lottery is disposed to select 666 as the
winning number when a draw is made, even if the chance of selecting 666 is very low
(51/1,000,000; I would like to thank Erik Weber for suggesting this example). I do not
claim that such dispositions exist, and hence I do not claim that this lottery should be
ascribed the disposition to have 666 as its outcome. What I want to claim is as follows:
even if our definition of dispositions is so liberal that f might refer to very low prob-
abilities, dispositions still depend on the existence of regularities. Only, in this case the
regularities involved would have very limited strength, to be compared with, e.g., the
regularity relating syphilis to paresis. (For the concept of strength of regularities, see
sec. 4.)
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starts from the observation that the existing criteria for strict lawfulness
are too restrictive, at least with respect to biology and perhaps also with
respect to other sciences. Therefore, she proposes a pragmatic approach
to the question of whether there are laws in biology. “The pragmatic
approach focuses on the role of laws in science, and queries biological
generalizations to see whether and to what degree they function in that
role” (1997, S469). The roles of laws that Mitchell focuses on are pre-
diction, explanation, and manipulation. If a generalization G is used for
one or several of these tasks, it qualifies as a pragmatic law. Mitchell
contrasts the pragmatic approach for evaluating the lawfulness of biology
both with the normative and with the paradigmatic approach. In the
normative approach, one begins with a norm or definition of lawfulness,
more specifically the traditional criteria for strict lawfulness (cf. above),
and reviews the candidate biological generalization to see whether it meets
the specified conditions. The paradigmatic approach begins with a set of
exemplars of laws (characteristically in physics) and compares these to
the generalizations in biology. If a match is found, the biological gener-
alization is considered a law (Mitchell 1997, S469; 2000, 244–50). It should
be noted, however, that paradigmatic and pragmatic considerations also
played an important role in the works of Nagel (1961), Hempel (1965),
and Goodman (1973). Criteria for lawfulness were assumed to rank New-
ton’s paradigmatic laws of motion as natural laws and statements about
the screws in Smith’s car as accidental generalizations. Also, the criteria
had to be such that laws are the vehicles for prediction (Goodman) and
explanation (Hempel) par excellence. So Mitchell’s approach does not
differ radically in spirit from the traditional one. The main difference,
and also the most interesting one, concerns the new gradual criteria she
proposes for ranking lawful generalizations (Mitchell 1997, S475–S478;
2000, 259–63). Generalizations are laws if and to the extent that they can
be used for prediction, explanation, or manipulation. Therefore, they must
be projectable: “The function of scientific generalizations is to provide
reliable expectations of the occurrence of events and patterns of properties.
The tools we use and design for this are true generalizations that describe
the actual structures that persist in the natural world” (1997, S477).
Given that these generalizations will seldom be universal, we need to
know when (in what contexts) they hold and when they do not. The
interesting problem is not that biological generalizations are contingent
but how and to what extent. Therefore, if we want to use a generalization,
we need to assess the stability and strength of the relation it describes.
Stability and strength are two ontological parameters for the evaluation
of a generalization’s usefulness. (Mitchell also distinguishes several grad-
ual representational criteria, such as degree of accuracy, level of ontology,
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simplicity, and cognitive manageability [1997, S477–S478; 2000, 259–63].
I do not discuss these criteria here.)
Stability. What are the conditions on which the regularity under study
is contingent? How spatiotemporally stable are these conditions? And
what is the relation between the regularity and its conditions (is it
deterministic, probabilistic, etc.)?
Stability is a gradual criterion. All regularities are contingent in that they
rest on certain conditions. These conditions are historically shaped and
are to a certain extent spatiotemporally stable. Stability does not bear
solely on the laws of physics. Only if contingency is interpreted gradually,
Mitchell claims, will our conceptual framework be rich enough to account
for the diversity of types of regularities and generalizations and for the
complexity found in the sciences (1997, S469–S477; 2000, 250–59).
Strength, too, is a gradual criterion. (In my opinion, the gradual character
of ‘strength’ is best expressed by framing this criterion as some kind of
covariance or correlation—deterministic regularities being a limit case.)
Strength. How strong is the regularity itself? Does it involve low or
high probabilities? Or is it deterministic? Does it result in one unique
outcome? Or are there multiple outcomes?
Mitchell’s pragmatic approach gives rise to two questions that I should
deal with. First, one may urge that it is too liberal in that it qualifies too
many generalizations (especially very weak or unstable ones) as lawful.
Second, one may question whether it sufficiently distinguishes between
causal laws and noncausal laws. Is Mitchell’s approach too liberal? Ob-
viously it is from the traditional point of view. Few pragmatic laws satisfy
the criteria for strict lawfulness. But does this provide us with sufficient
reason to deprive them of their honorific label ‘law’? And more specifically,
should the fact that Mitchell’s approach allows for very weak or unstable
pragmatic laws count as a shortcoming? I am of course willing to give
up the word ‘law’, but I doubt this would be of any help. Moreover, there
are two good reasons to stick to Mitchell’s approach.
A first reason is that many scientific generalizations (in many different
scientific disciplines) are called laws, while failing to satisfy the criteria
for strict lawfulness. By contrast, their status as a law and their usefulness
in practice can be easily acknowledged within Mitchell’s framework. The-
ories of lawfulness that apply more stringent criteria run the risk of selling
short these generalizations. The history of classical genetics provides nice
examples of such nonstrict scientific laws. William Bateson (1900) was
deeply convinced that it would be both useful and possible to discover
the laws of heredity. This conviction was mainly inspired by the works
of Francis Galton (1889, 1897), who formulated the law of regression and
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what would later be known as the law of ancestral inheritance. (For a
discussion of Galton’s theory of heredity, see Leuridan [2007].) But at
that time Bateson also got acquainted, via Hugo de Vries, with the works
of Gregor Mendel (Mendel 1865/1933; de Vries 1900). What is particularly
interesting is the way Bateson conceived of the laws of heredity. He ac-
knowledged that both Galton’s laws and Mendel’s law (at that time,
Bateson did not distinguish between the law of segregation and the law
of independent assortment) are subject to exceptions and have a limited
scope of application. However, this did not dissuade him from holding
to the label ‘law’. Nor did he later change his mind, when ever more
exceptions to Mendel’s laws were adduced by the biometricians who re-
jected Mendel’s theory in favor of Galton’s (Bateson 1902). In the works
of Thomas Hunt Morgan and his coworkers (Morgan et al. 1915; Morgan
1919, 1926/1928), Mendel’s findings of segregation and independent as-
sortment were called laws, even if they were complemented with systematic
explanations of their failures (coupling and crossing over, sex-linked in-
heritance, failure of dominance, and so on). Even today, textbooks in
modern genetics start with an overview of Mendel (Klug and Cummings
1997, chap. 3). Mendel’s findings were certainly not strict laws, but their
usefulness can be acknowledged within the pragmatic approach, as can
their status as ‘laws’. Much research in classical genetics aimed at un-
covering the conditions for the different regularities, assessing their sta-
bility, specifying their strength, and so on. Nothing is gained by merely
claiming that these regularities are not lawful.
A second reason for sticking to Mitchell’s approach is that it also nicely
fits actual scientific practice. Scientists invest plenty of time and money
to discover (statistical) regularities that can be used for prediction, ex-
planation, or interventions. Granted, few of the resulting descriptions are
called laws. But what is more interesting is the fact that the criteria used
nicely fit Mitchell’s liberality. Austin Bradford Hill (1965, 295) famously
addressed the problem of causal inference. His article is still very influential
today (at least it is cited frequently). Hill envisaged situations in occu-
pational medicine in which our observations reveal a statistically signif-
icant association between two variables (a disease or injury A and con-
ditions of work B) but where our background knowledge (the general
body of medical knowledge) does not suffice to determine whether the
relation is causal. His article was unquestionably motivated pragmatically:
“In occupational medicine our object is usually to take action. If this be
operative cause and that be deleterious effect, then we shall wish to in-
tervene to abolish or reduce death or disease” (300). To be useful in
reducing death or disease, an association need not be strong: “We may
recall John Snow’s classic analysis of the opening weeks of the cholera
epidemic of 1854. . . . The death rate that he recorded in the customers
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supplied with the grossly polluted water of the Southwark and Vauxhall
Company was in truth quite low—71 deaths in each 10,000 houses. What
stands out vividly is the fact that the small rate is 14 times the figure of
5 deaths per 10,000 houses supplied with the sewage-free water of the
rival Lambeth Company” (296). The weakness of the relation between
sewage and cholera ( is very low) does not make it unusable forP(AFB)
occupational (preventive) medicine. It underlay interventions to improve
public health. To be useful in reducing death or disease, an association
need not be stable either: “Arsenic can undoubtedly cause cancer of the
skin in man but it has never been possible to demonstrate such an effect
on any other animal” (298). Whether arsenic causes cancer in animals is
of little interest if the intended domain of application consists of humans.
Evidence from humans should suffice. To conclude, the case of Hill shows
that Mitchell’s approach nicely fits the pragmatic slant of occupational
medicine (which, after all, is part of the life sciences). And it shows that
Mitchell’s liberality regarding very weak or unstable pragmatic laws is an
advantage, rather than a disadvantage.
The case of Hill brings my argument to the second question that is
raised by Mitchell’s approach. Hill explicitly intended to distinguish causal
regularities from mere associations, but Mitchell’s framework provides
no means for making such a distinction. A regularity can be very stable
or very strong, even if it is spurious. The distinction is favorable for two
reasons. First, causalists, regarding explanation, allege that all explanantia
should cite (at least some of ) the explanandum’s causes. Second, there is
widespread agreement among philosophers that manipulation requires
causal relations. I do not take up a position regarding the indispensability
of causal relations in either explanation or manipulation here.5 But in
order not to lose the causalists of explanation or manipulation, I distin-
guish between causal regularities and noncausal ones.
This distinction can be drawn with the help of Woodward’s theory. In
Woodward’s view, a generalization is explanatory if and only if it is in-
variant. And it is invariant to the extent that it “remains stable or un-
changed as various other changes occur” (2003b, 239). Different senses
of invariance can be distinguished, but the most important sense is in-
variance under interventions, which is a gradual concept.6 Some gener-
5. Contrary to what is commonly assumed, policy may be based on noncausal or
spurious relations. See Leuridan, Weber, and Van Dyck (2008) for the distinction
between manipulative policy and selective policy.
6. Interventions are informally defined as follows (for a formal definition, see Wood-
ward [2003b], 98–99): “an intervention on some variable X with respect to some second
variable Y is a causal process that changes the value of X in an appropriately exogenous
way, so that if a change in the value of Y occurs, it occurs only in virtue of the change
in the value of X and not through some other causal route” (94).
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alizations are more invariant than others, depending on the range and
importance of the interventions under which they are invariant. Invariance
also involves a threshold. If a generalization is not stable under any in-
terventions, it is noninvariant and hence neither causal nor explanatory
(248–49).
With the help of Woodward’s conceptual framework, Mitchell’s concept
of pragmatic law can be refined. Admittedly, Woodward defines ‘laws’
traditionally (2003b, 166–67). He also argues that lawfulness is not of any
help regarding scientific explanation. Laws are only explanatory insofar
as they are invariant. Laws that are not change-relating, and hence not
invariant, are not explanatory (208). But this does not preclude us from
joining the concepts of pragmatic law and invariance. (For more detailed
comparisons between both frameworks, see Mitchell [2000], 258–59, and
Woodward [2003b], 295–99.) In the remainder of this article, I repeatedly
use the following four concepts:
(P-regularity). A regularity is a pragmatic regularity (a P-regularity)
if it has some degree of stability and strength.
(P-law). A generalization is a pragmatic law (a P-law) if it describes
a P-regularity. It has stability and strength to the extent that the
regularity it describes is stable and strong. It allows one to a certain
extent to predict, to explain, or to manipulate the world. It may, but
need not, satisfy the criteria for strict lawfulness.
(cP-law). A P-law is a causal P-law (a cP-law) if it is invariant under
some range of interventions. It allows one to a certain extent to
predict, to explain, or to manipulate the world.7
(cP-regularity). A P-regularity is a causal P-regularity (a cP-regular-
ity) if it is described by a cP-law.8
Up until now, we have seen that whereas cs-mechanisms are put forward
as an alternative to strict regularities (sec. 2), they are nevertheless defined
in terms of regularities (sec. 3). In this section, I have presented concepts
of regularity/law that more nicely fit scientific practice. Now the question
regarding the precise relations between cs-mechanisms and P-regularities
and between mechanistic models and P-laws can be addressed.
7. For the use of cP-laws in nonmechanistic explanation both of single events and
regularities, see sec. 7.
8. I am assuming that every regularity can be described by some generalization. Al-
though Woodward defines interventions (and hence causation) with respect to gener-
alizations, he does not oppose causal regularities (2003b, 14, 118–22). In the interest
of readability, I will write ‘(c)P-regularity’ (respectively ‘(c)P-law’) instead of ‘P-regu-
larity or cP-regularity’ (respectively ‘P-law or cP-law’).
MECHANISMS REPLACE LAWS OF NATURE? 000
5. The Ontological Relations between Mechanisms and (c)P-Regularities.
In this section, I first argue that cs-mechanisms are ontologically depen-
dent on (c)P-regularities. No x can count as a mechanism, unless it in-
volves regularities. Then I investigate the reverse relation, that is, whether
there can be (c)P-regularities without any underlying mechanism. Mech-
anisms are ontologically dependent on the existence of regularities both
at the macrolevel and at the microlevel. First, no x can count as a cs-
mechanism, unless it produces some macrolevel regular behavior. Second,
to produce such macrolevel regular behavior, this x has to rely on mi-
crolevel regularities.
In the life sciences, reference to mechanisms cannot be detached from
matters of projectability. Morgan and his coworkers sought after the cs-
mechanism of Mendelian heredity to explain both Mendel’s findings and
their exceptions in a systematic way (Morgan et al. 1915; Morgan 1919,
1926/1928). Mainly drawing from findings on fruit flies, they explained
definite macrolevel behaviors (definite phenotypic ratios in subsequent
generations of organisms) by referring to the behaviors (independent as-
sortment, crossing over, interference, and so on) of a complex set of parts
or entities (gametes, chromosomes, factors or genes, and so on). But they
were not only interested in the fruit flies in their laboratories. They were
interested in the mechanism of heredity in Drosophila and in other species
as well. As evidence accumulated, both Mendelian inheritance and the
underlying chromosomal mechanism were more and more considered a
general phenomenon. In the end, Morgan formulated the theory of the
gene (including Mendel’s two laws) without reference to any specific spe-
cies (1926/1928, 25). He likewise gave an abstract mechanistic explanation
(chap. 3). The case of Morgan illustrates not only that talk in terms of
laws is compatible with talk in terms of mechanisms but also that reference
to mechanisms in the life sciences cannot be detached from matters of
projectability. Because of this concern for projectability, Glennan (2002,
S345) stresses that the behavior of cs-mechanisms as a whole should be
stable.
At this point, the reader might worry that metaphysical issues (about
what a mechanism is) get conflated with epistemological ones (about the
use of mechanistic knowledge). Such worry would be baseless. It is not
that our concern for projectability implies that mechanisms should be
stable or robust. Rather, it implies that life scientists should search after
robust mechanisms (it is a matter of fact that, to phrase it naively, they
succeed in this). And if the concept of ‘cs-mechanism’ is to fit scientific
practice (as is argued by Machamer et al. [2000, 1–2] and Bechtel and
Abrahamsen [2005, 422]), it must incorporate this notion of stability. But,
per definitionem, this comes down to the following statement:
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(H-REG) There can be no cs-mechanism without some higher-level
(c)P-regularity (i.e., the stable behavior produced by that mechanism).
Both M* and M† conform to H-REG. (Note that this is a stronger claim
than the one I argued for in sec. 3.) Following M†, mechanisms perform
a function. They have a dispositional property that f-regularly results in
M if the conditions C and W are satisfied. Even very weak dispositions
(see n. 4) can be accounted for by the concept of (c)P-regularity. Following
M*, mechanisms are productive of regular changes from start or setup
to finish or termination conditions: they exhibit cP-regularities.
Are no exceptions to H-REG possible? A prima facie exception has
been provided by Bogen (2005, 398–400), who criticizes Machamer et al.
(2000) for providing an unfounded regularist account of causation, and
Machamer (2004, n. 1) has sided with him. According to regularism,
there is no causation without regularity. By contrast, Bogen argues for
an Anscombian account in which causality is one thing, and regularity is
another. From this he concludes that mechanists need not invoke regu-
larities or invariant generalizations. Some cs-mechanisms, he states, are
too unreliable to fit regularism: “The mechanisms which initiate electrical
activity in post-synaptic neurons by releasing neuro-transmitters are a
case in point. They are numerous enough, and each of them has enough
chances to release neurotransmitters to support the functions of the ner-
vous system. But each one fails more often than it succeeds, and so far, no
one has found differences among background conditions which account for
this” (Bogen 2005, 400; my emphasis). Does this example convincingly
show that some cs-mechanisms are too unreliable to fit regularism? The
answer to that question depends on what is meant by ‘regularity’ and
‘regularism’. Anscombe (1981, 133) argues that causation does not imply
strict regularity. Bogen (2005, 399, 411) seems to adopt this strict inter-
pretation of ‘regularity’, too. If ‘regularity’ and ‘regularism’ are interpreted
in this strict sense, then the example convincingly shows that mechanists
need not be regularists. It does not show, however, that H-REG is false;
it does not show that some cs-mechanisms go without (nonstrict) higher-
level P-regularities. Neither P-regularities nor cP-regularities need be strict
or deterministic. Nor do they need to be backed by strict regularities. The
concept of (c)P-regularity is compatible with genuine indeterminism. (Bo-
gen [2005, 398] classifies both Mitchell and Woodward as regularists. If
regularism is interpreted strictly, this classification is unfounded. Mitchell
[1997, S478] and Woodward [2003b, 41] explicitly leave room for non-
deterministic pragmatic laws and invariant generalizations, respectively.)
A genuine exception to H-REG would be provided by a cs-mechanism
that produces a token causal relation that happens only once. Such a
unique token causal relation cannot be regarded as instantiating an actual
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regularity. (I would like to thank Phyllis McKay Illari for raising this
point.) My account does not rule out unique token causal relations. I use
Woodward’s theory of invariance to distinguish between causal and non-
causal P-laws and regularities. From this it does not follow that regularity
(even weak regularity) is a necessary condition for causality. Yet can
unique token causal relations be constituted by cs-mechanisms? I doubt
this. Unique token causal relations rather seem the product of Salmon/
Railton mechanisms, that is, actual sequences of interconnected events
(cf. Glennan 2002, S345, S349–S350).
Let us turn now to the cs-mechanisms’ microlevel dependence on cP-
regularities. A mechanism’s behavior is not groundless. It is produced by
its component parts. Suppose now, that some part pi behaves completely
irregularly: it may do ai1 or ai2 or . . . or ain, but what it does is the result
of a completely random internal process. There is no relation whatsoever
to the behavior of the other parts pj of the mechanism or to the previous
behaviors of pi itself. Suppose moreover, that the same holds for all the
other parts of the mechanism. Clearly, this would make it very unlikely
for the mechanism to produce a macrolevel P-regularity, let alone a cP-
regularity. So unless the behavior of its parts is sufficiently stable and
sufficiently strong, that is, unless it is P-regular, and unless these behaviors
are organized sufficiently well, the mechanism’s overall behavior will fail
to be P-regular. (I do not rule out that some of the mechanism’s parts
behave strictly randomly. However, then, sufficiently many other parts
should behave P-regularly, and their behavior should be organized suf-
ficiently well.)
(L-REG) There can be no cs-mechanism without some lower-level
(c)P-regularities (i.e., the regular behaviors, operations, or activities
displayed or engaged in by the mechanism’s parts).
Again, this is stressed by Glennan (2002, S344): a mechanism’s parts must
be objects—in the absence of interventions, their properties must remain
relatively stable. Translating this to M* and M†, these parts’ activities or
operations must be (c)P-regularities.
Up until now, I have shown that there can be no cs-mechanisms without
both macro- and microlevel regularities. But what about the reverse re-
lation? Can there be a (c)P-regularity without an underlying mechanism?
In other words, can there be fundamental regularities whose stability and
strength are somehow sui generis? Glennan (1996, 61–63) assumes or
stipulates that they exist. That is more than I need. In my view, funda-
mental P-regularities are possible, and that suffices to establish an on-
tological asymmetry between P-regularities and cs-mechanisms. (It might
be the case that, as a matter of fact, all (c)P-regularities rest on some
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underlying mechanism—I see nothing metaphysically wrong in an infinite
ontological regress of mechanisms and regularities.)
6. The Epistemological Relations between Mechanistic Models and (c)P-
Laws. Drawing on the findings of the previous section, I now show that
mechanistic explanation cannot dispense with (c)P-laws. To adequately
describe cs-mechanisms, mechanistic models need to incorporate—and
thus are epistemologically dependent on—(c)P-laws. By contrast, a gen-
eralization may count as a P-law without describing any underlying mech-
anism.
A large part of the complex-systems literature about mechanisms, es-
pecially the contributions by Machamer et al. (2000) and by Bechtel and
Abrahamsen (2005), is motivated by the failure of the D-N model to
provide an adequate account of scientific explanation (see sec. 2). Expla-
nation, especially in the life sciences, rarely if ever involves subsumption
under strict laws. Far more often it takes the form of mechanistic expla-
nation: one models or describes the mechanism underlying the explan-
andum phenomenon. This raises the question what criteria a model should
satisfy to count as a model of a cs-mechanism. The trivial answer is that
it should adequately represent that mechanism. Less trivially, it should
adequately represent (i) the mechanism’s macrolevel behavior, (ii) the
mechanism’s parts and their properties, (iii) the operations they perform
or the activities they engage in, and (iv) the organization of these parts
and operations. Let us call this the adequacy criterion for mechanistic
models (see also Craver 2006, 367–73). So, by section 5, the model should
adequately describe both the macrolevel and the microlevel (c)P-regular-
ities. Hence, by definition, it should incorporate (c)P-laws. Thus, the ad-
equacy criterion implies that all mechanistic models must incorporate (c)P-
laws. (Note that my claim differs from Weber’s [2008], in that I do not
focus solely on physical laws.)
But then the following question arises. Is it possible to gain evidence
for a generalization’s lawfulness without relying on mechanistic back-
ground knowledge? Can one be convinced that some generalization de-
scribes a regularity that is sufficiently stable or strong (for some particular
application context), and can one assess this stability or strength without
any evidence for some underlying mechanism? In short, can a generali-
zation count as a (c)P-law without referring to mechanisms? To be sure,
this question is not idle, and moreover it has large epistemological import.
It is not idle since mechanistic background knowledge is useful in assessing
the lawfulness of regularities (see previous discussion of T. H. Morgan;
see also Darden 1991) and is used so in many different scientific disciplines.
It has large epistemological import since, given what we know from the
first part of this section, the epistemological dependence of (c)P-laws on
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mechanistic models would imply an infinite (and vicious) epistemological
regress. To be sure that some model M is a model of a cs-mechanism, I
would need to know that the generalizations figuring in it areG , . . . , G1 n
(c)P-laws. Yet then I would have to know the underlying mechanisms. It
certainly does not do to rely on the existence of fundamental laws. First,
in section 5, I have argued that fundamental regularities are not impos-
sible. Yet it is still an open question whether they actually exist. Second,
granted that there are fundamental regularities, few or no practicing bi-
ologists would turn to fundamental laws in explaining biological phe-
nomena.
Machamer et al. (2000) have tried to solve the problem of infinite regress
by introducing the notion of ‘bottoming out’. In their conception, nested
hierarchical descriptions of mechanisms bottom out in lowest-level mech-
anisms. These are but fundamental relative to the purposes of a given
scientist or discipline. Their entities and activities are taken to be fun-
damental (and hence not calling for further explanation) relative to the
research question at hand, even if it is known that in other scientific fields
they are considered as nonfundamental, macrolevel phenomena (13). Al-
though this notion nicely fits scientific practice, it offers at best a pseu-
dosolution to our problem. By treating some entities and their behavior
as fundamental (relative to some context), one has not thereby shown
(but only assumed) that that behavior is sufficiently stable or strong (for
that context). In the rest of this section, I face the problem head on and
show that (c)P-laws are not epistemologically dependent on mechanistic
models. Mechanistic knowledge is not indispensable for the assessment
of a generalization’s lawfulness. Other means do at least as well.
A most natural candidate is performing experiments. Experiments are
often ascribed the power to reveal causal connections and to confirm or
refute claims about stable regularities, even if the relation between ex-
periments and laws or theories is fraught with several problems (see Frank-
lin 1995, 2003).9 Moreover, experiments are very frequently performed in
9. Franklin (1995, 196–204) discusses three problems. The first is known as the ‘theory-
ladenness of observation’. Observation statements and measurement reports use terms
whose meanings are determined by a particular theory. (This problem may be gener-
alized. The realization of an experiment often also depends on theoretical insights
about the experimental [object-apparatus] system and the possible interactions with its
environment. Prior knowledge is needed about the object under study and about the
instruments used [Radder 2003b, 165, 168–69].) The second is the ‘Duhem-Quine prob-
lem’. If some hypothesis h generates a prediction e, it always does so together with
some background knowledge b. Hence, if is observed instead of e, either h is to∼ e
be blamed or b or both. So one can always save h by blaming b only. The third problem
is the fact that experiments are fallible and that different experimental results may
discord. Franklin concludes that although these problems are important and impel us
000 BERT LEURIDAN
biology and the biomedical sciences. The question now is to what extent
P-regularities may be experimentally discovered or established, without
any knowledge of some underlying mechanism. I start by giving a very
general characterization of experiments.
(EXP) In an experiment, an object is placed in some controlled en-
vironment. Using some apparatus, it is manipulated such that it as-
sumes some definite property . Then, again using some ap-Xp x
paratus, the outcome is measured in some (other) property Y. More
specifically, it is verified whether there is some relation between
and (for some or all possible values x of X and y ofXp x Yp y
Y), and if so, what is its strength and how it can be characterized?
Let me briefly dwell on this description. The term ‘object’ should be
interpreted as broadly as possible. It may refer to one particular material
object or to some complex of objects or to some sample of liquid or gas
and so on. An environment is ‘controlled’ if the relation between X and
Y is not influenced or disturbed by other factors. Eliminating all possible
disturbing factors (and all possible sources of error in general) is a very
delicate and difficult task, a large part of which depends on statistical
analysis and data reduction (cf. Galison 1987; Franklin 1990). I return
to this issue in a moment. Emphasis is laid on ‘manipulation’ since this,
much more than passive observation, is considered a particularly reliable
way to find out causal relationships.10 Finally, apparatuses are often in-
dispensable in experimental designs. They play at least three different
roles: as a device for manipulation, for measurement, or to control dis-
turbing influences. (In Radder [2003a], the role of technology and instru-
ments in experiments is discussed several times by many different authors.)
This characterization, the mechanicist may argue, clearly reveals the
use of mechanistic background knowledge in experimentation. If you want
to create a controlled environment and rule out all disturbing influences,
much is gained by knowing what these influences are. Such knowledge,
furthermore, is outstandingly provided by mechanistic models. I endorse
this claim but challenge that it is noxious for my argumentation. Mech-
anistic background knowledge is highly valuable for the experimenter. Yet
it certainly is not indispensable.
to treat experimental results carefully, they are not insuperable. Experimental evidence
may serve to test laws and theories.
10. Woodward (2003a) heavily stresses the connections between experimentation and
manipulation on the one hand and causation on the other hand. In his view, experiments
are not only an excellent tool for causal discovery and causal inference. To say that
X causes Y also “means nothing more and nothing less than that if an appropriately
designed experimental manipulation of [X ] were to be carried out, [Y ] (or the prob-
ability of [Y ]) would change in value” (90).
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In many experiments, namely, in randomized experimental designs, dis-
turbing influences are not screened off physically. (See Psillos [2004, sec.
5] for a similar yet somewhat distinct discussion of randomized experi-
mental designs and mechanisms.) Instead, experimenters endeavor to can-
cel out their influence by means of randomization. From the target pop-
ulation P, a sample S is randomly selected. The random sampling
procedure should guarantee that the subjects in S do not differ drastically
from the rest of the subjects in P. In other words, for any variable Z, its
distribution in S should not deviate drastically from its distribution in P.
(In practice this is not guaranteed. Randomization only works with cer-
tainty in the limit as sample size tends to infinity.) Then the subjects in
S are randomly divided into an experimental group and a controlXS
group . All subjects in are manipulated such that they assume someK XS S
definite property , whereas those in are not so manipulatedKXp x S
( )—often they are given a placebo. This procedure should guar-Xp∼ x
antee that the subjects in and most closely resemble each other,X KS S
except with respect to the cause variable X and its effects. (Instead of
having only and , one may also create several experimentalXp x Xp∼ x
groups, each with a different level of X.) Then the relation between X
and the effect variable Y is measured.
Randomization is highly context independent. It allows control for
disturbing influences without even knowing them. Thus, mechanistic back-
ground knowledge is no conditio sine qua non for experimentation, and
it is not indispensable regarding the assessment of the lawfulness of a
generalization—even if there were a mechanism underlying the corre-
sponding regularity. Fortunately, we escape the problem of infinite epi-
stemic regress.
7. Conclusion: Can Mechanisms Really Replace Laws of Nature? In this
article, I have substantiated four claims. First, cs-mechanisms as defined
in M* or M† necessarily involve (c)P-regularities. Second, even if it cannot
be ruled out that all (c)P-regularities involve an underlying mechanism,
it is at least possible that there are fundamental regularities. Third, no
model can count as a mechanistic model, unless it incorporates (c)P-laws.
Finally, a generalization can be considered a (c)P-law even if it does not
refer to an underlying mechanism.
Is there then any tension between the mechanistic literature and Mitch-
ell’s theory of pragmatic laws? In one sense, there is not. The above
arguments show that the mechanistic literature cannot replace (but rather
depends on) talk in terms of laws of nature, provided the latter are con-
ceived of pragmatically. So the two must be compatible. Yet in another
sense, there is a tension that deserves further elaboration. Mitchell’s ac-
count is more encompassing than the mechanicists’: there are stable gen-
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eralizations (and corresponding regularities) that are not (or not easily or
not fruitfully) amenable to mechanistic explanation yet that are useful for
prediction, explanation, or manipulation. Whereas these are outside the
scope of the mechanistic literature, Mitchell’s account allows us to take
them seriously.
Fundamental P-laws, if existent, would provide an obvious example.
Yet there are also genuinely biological and social P-laws that are not
amenable to mechanistic explanation. Sawyer (2004) argues that there are
social properties, for example, “having a dispute” or “being a church,”
which are multiply realized in wildly disjunctive sets of lower-level mech-
anisms. Such properties have two features that are of interest for us: they
are not amenable to mechanistic explanation, and they can figure in causal
laws. “To the extent that social properties are real, [social mechanist]
explanation may be limited to the explanation of individual cases that do
not generalize widely, resulting in an interpretivist or case study approach
rather than a science of generalizable laws and theories” (266; my emphasis;
arguably, these causal laws are not strict). Sawyer focuses on the social
sciences, but similar cases can be found in the biological sciences. Division
of labor is a relatively stable phenomenon that is found in ants, bees, and
wasps (Mitchell 2009, 46–48). In each species, division of labor is the
outcome of a different evolutionary pathway, and it is realized by a dif-
ferent mechanism. For example, diverging behavior between colony mem-
bers is partly explained in terms of genetic differences, but fire ants and
honeybees harbor different degrees of genetic variability (48; Mitchell uses
the case of division of labor for different purposes, i.e., to show that
biological laws are contingent rather than necessary). In short, both in
the social sciences and in biology there are stable regularities that are
multiply realized by (wildly) disjunctive mechanisms. Focusing on these
underlying mechanisms may be interesting, but it comes at a cost: one
loses sight of the generality of the regularities (and corresponding laws)
in question.
It could be objected that in these cases there is no single relatively
general regularity but rather a wild disjunction of very local regularities
(each constituted by a different mechanism) and that by treating them as
single regularities, one illicitly lumps together things that should be dis-
tinguished. I disagree, however. Whether such lumping would be illicit
depends on pragmatic considerations. If one endeavors to predict, to
explain, or to bring about something, one may in some cases rely on
generalizations that describe multiply realized P-regularities. What mat-
ters is whether they are sufficiently stable and strong for the purpose at
hand, not whether they are the result of a single rather than many kinds
of mechanisms. Focusing on the social sciences, Julian Reiss (2007, 176–
81) argues that investigating causal mechanisms is not always a good
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strategy for accurate description, prediction, or control. On the basis of
these findings, he argues for a more pluralistic methodology of the social
sciences. Social scientists should not only strive for mechanistic models.
Description, prediction, and control are nonexplanatory aims of science.
Reiss does not question the assumption that causal mechanisms play an
essential role in theoretical explanation. Are Machamer et al. (2000) right
in claiming that explanation requires providing a description of a cs-
mechanism (cf. above)? I think they are not. In Woodward’s framework,
there is in a sense room for nonmechanistic explanations of both single
events and regularities.
Woodward explicitly discusses the case of single events. He gives the
example of invoking the ideal gas law to explain why the pressure of a
sample of gas enclosed in a fixed volume increases when the temperature
is increased: “According to the manipulationist account, so-called phe-
nomenological laws or generalizations can figure in explanations . . . even
if they tell us nothing about underlying mechanisms, processes or constit-
uents” (2003b, 221; my emphasis). In my view, Woodward’s theory may
also leave room for nonmechanistic explanation of regularities. Consider
a causal regularity, say A’s causing B’s. According to Woodward, ex-
planatory relevance is intimately tied to what-if-things-had-been-different
information. Suppose now that we find out that A is not a direct cause
of B (but that A is a cause of C, which in turn is a cause of B). This
would allow us to answer more what-if-things-had-been-different ques-
tions (e.g., about what would happen given disturbing influences on C)
and thus should count as an explanation of the relation between A and
B, even if A, B, and C are at the same mechanistic level.11
Does nonmechanistic explanation using cP-laws escape the objection
we encountered in section 2, namely, that subsumption of some phenom-
enon under a law is not explanatory since it does not show why the
phenomenon occurs (i.e., why the association holds)? I do not deny that
mechanistic explanations, if available, are generally better than nonmecha-
nistic explanations. They often provide more what-if-things-had-been-dif-
ferent information and hence better or deeper understanding (Woodward
2003b, 223). Yet the objection in question involves a shift of explanandum
(from the original phenomenon that is subsumed under the law to the
regularity described by that law). This shift may be legitimate or illegit-
imate. Whether subsumption under some cP-law counts as a good ex-
planation depends on pragmatic factors (contextual features such as the
explanation seeker’s background knowledge). Consider the following ex-
ample: “The slush on the sidewalk remained liquid during the frost because
11. Weber and Leuridan (2008) call this a ‘mediating mechanism’ as opposed to a ‘cs-
mechanism’. For the notion of ‘levels of mechanisms’, see Craver (2007, chap. 5).
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it had been sprinkled with salt.” According to McMullin, who borrows
the example from Hempel, this counts as an explanation only if one did
not know that salt had been sprinkled there or if one did not know the
effect of sprinkling salt on snow. “If someone who knowingly sprinkled
salt on snow, which then proceeded to melt, were to seek an explanation
for this, it would be a rather weak response to say that under these
conditions, salt always does this!” (McMullin 1984, 214). What she calls
for is, presumably, a mechanistic explanation.12 In scientific contexts, the
background knowledge of the explanation seekers is generally such that
they would not settle for nonmechanistic explanations, and the shift of
explanandum would be legitimate. Yet this does not alter the fact that on
many occasions (mostly in everyday life) nonmechanistic explanations do
suffice, and the shift of explanandum would be illegitimate.
The mechanicists are right in criticizing strict laws of nature and D-N
explanation, and their analysis of mechanisms and mechanistic expla-
nation is highly valuable. Yet the mechanistic account does not render
Mitchell’s pragmatic solution to the problem of lawfulness superfluous.
It cannot replace (but depends on) talk in terms of pragmatic laws of
nature, and it is less encompassing than Mitchell’s theory.
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